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Chinese government representatives and scholars have attempted to ameliorate fears 
about China’s rise by portraying China as a new and friendlier kind of great power. It is 
claimed that this represents a new way of relating which transcends problematic Western 
understandings of self-other relations and their tendency to slip into domination and 
enmity. This article takes such claims as a point of departure, and analyses them with 
focus on the explicit discussions of friendship in international relations theory. Paying 
attention to current Chinese thinking which emphasises guanxi relationships, friendship 
can contribute to the development of genuinely relational international relations 
thinking and move beyond a focus on ossified forms of friendship and enmity centred 
on the anxious self. The vantage point of friendship suggests a way out of the dangers 




Chinese policymakers, scholars and pundits have attempted to ameliorate fears about China’s 
rise by portraying China as a new and friendlier kind of great power. It is claimed that this 
represents a new way of relating which transcends problematic Western understandings of self-
other relations, and their tendency to slip into domination and enmity. Claims along such lines 
can be seen in President Xi Jinping’s official discourse, which portrays the Chinese nation as 
culturally predisposed to friendly, peaceful and harmonious behaviour abroad, and which lists 
friendship as one of 12 key terms for his socialist ‘core value system’ at home (Xi, 2014; 
People’s Daily Online, 2014). These claims have been illustrated in various international 
nation-branding events, often through the Confucian adage that ‘it is glorious to receive friends 
from afar’ (Callahan, 2010:2). They have also been an important part of emerging debates over 
a possible Chinese school of international relations (IR) (Noesselt, 2015). Famously, Zhao 
Tingyang claims that Chinese traditions offer a ‘Chinese ontology, the ontology of relations, 
instead of the western ontology of things’ which enables the peaceful transformation of 
enemies into friends (Zhao, 2006:33, 34; for a discussion, see Nordin, 2016a; 2016b), and 
researchers discuss ‘China’s self-perceived role of a friend versus the (often Western) exploiter’ 
(Shih and Yin, 2013:81). Although few foreign policy documents or academic texts focus 
solely or even primarily on friendship, this terminology is persistent and claims are repeatedly 
made through the language of friendship. 
Taking such use of the term ‘friendship’ as a point of departure, this article discussing the 
connection between friendship and IR (cf. King and Smith, 2007; Koschut and Oelsner, 2014). 
It develops scholarship which understands friendship as a conceptual tool, pointing to a concern 




relationship, friendship denotes a way of thinking about the co-constitution of self with other, 
and theorises the dynamics of such co-foundation. Such a concern is as pressing for states as it 
is for individuals, as much a matter for the political as for the personal. A contribution to theory 
rather than policy, this article brings together and juxtaposes a number of ways of thinking 
through the language of ‘friendship’ and analyses the implications of different theorisations for 
thinking about world relations. 
The article progresses in three main parts. Part one summarises the historical role of friendship 
in political thought, drawing attention to similarities between the Chinese and European ancient 
traditions. In these ancient traditions, friendship played a role in cultivating the self and 
promoting virtues in politics at all levels. Later thought under the state system transformed the 
meaning and importance of friendship and politics. On the one hand, friendship was 
increasingly associated with the personal and emotional, and confined to the private realm. On 
the other hand, ‘friendship’ was able to appear in the public political realm if it was transformed 
into overarching and general forms of community such as citizenship and nationality. 
Importantly, this public friendship was bound to the idea of enmity, and its logic of Us versus 
Them. 
Part two builds on these introductory observations. It develops the argument that the discipline 
of IR has been shaped by a form of thinking which privileges ‘things’ over ‘relations’ (Jackson 
and Nexon, 1999; Nordin and Smith, 2017). This distinction contrasts an analysis which starts 
by positing or assuming that there are given ‘things’ (such as states, nations, and power) that 
pre-exist their relations; and an analysis which starts from the position that ‘things’ are always 
the effects of relational processes. To the extent that we can speak of ‘things’ in the latter case, 
these are not substances, but formations, contexts, or differences that are always changing and 
incomplete (Jackson and Nexon, 1999:304, 314-15). We show how even some theoretical 
approaches to IR that aver to focus on relations fall back on an ontology of things. This is 
connected to the marginalisation of friendship as a key relationship through which self and 
other are co-constituted. In the process, the central question of friendship – the question of 
what it means to become with others, and what it means to share and shape a world with others 
– has been lost to much analysis in IR. 
Part three suggests that recovering friendship enables a recast IR based instead on ‘relational 
ontologies’. It starts by focusing on friendship through the concept of guanxi relationships that 
has recently been advanced by Qin Yaqing as a Chinese relational ontology. It then develops 
Qin’s account by discussing Felix Berenskötter’s argument that friendship between states is 
important because friends help calm the anxiety that is an effect of ontological insecurity. 
Drawing on Qin’s work, alongside similar concerns of L.H.M. Ling, we argue that 
contemporary developments of traditional Chinese thought are particularly significant for IR 
debates because they indicate a co-constitutive self-other relationship which does not 
emphasize anxiety and fear of difference or of misrecognition. 
Finally, we conclude that the real divide in understandings of friendship and IR is not between 
China and the West (nor, for that matter, between ancient and modern). Instead we contrast the 
role of friendship in the ontology of things on the one hand, and relational ontologies on the 
other. The first ontology tends to reproduce an essentialist self-other dichotomy and ossifies 
friendship as a role or attribute; the second tends to allow for transformation, and so is open to 
the co-constitutive dynamics suggested by friendship. Paying attention to the current trend in 
Chinese IR theory which emphasises relationships and guanxi friendship can contribute to the 




enmity centred on the anxious self. In so doing this article joins in efforts already under way to 
re-centre the relations of International Relations. Relational thinking can be seen in growing 
efforts to decolonise the discipline, in favour of a pluriverse of relational ontologies that draw 
inspiration from non-Western traditions or ‘epistemologies of the South’ (Santos, 2014; Ling, 
Messari, and Tickner, 2017).  
In summary, this article shows that an explicit focus on friendship in IR adds a distinct and 
valuable vantage point on relationality by refocusing attention on the co-constitution and 
dynamism of self in relations with others. It therefore makes a contribution to the ontology of 
IR, and offers a resource for understanding the complex phenomena that form the focus of its 
discussions and concerns. 
 
Transforming friendship: from friend-friend to friend-enemy 
Standard accounts of the vocabulary of politics and IR treat the inclusion of ‘friendship’ in 
their lexicon as somewhat of a novelty. Instead, they centre the state, power, sovereignty, 
citizens, nations, and peoples. If friendship appears at all it tends to be tied to enmity, which 
has also shaped much thought in IR. Whilst many accept that states and nations can have 
enemies, there is much wider scepticism about the possibilities for friendship (e.g. Keller 2009; 
cf. Koschut and Oelsner 2014, 6-8). 
So, why does scepticism persist? In answering this question considerable light is brought to 
what talk of friendship in IR theory might mean. Many of those who are sceptical about 
friendship in both politics and IR typically rely on an unexamined assumption about what 
friendship is and what it must be: the ‘contemporary-affective’ view of friendship (Smith 
2011b, 12ff). This account assumes friendship to be a private and voluntary relationship 
between individuals characterised by emotional attachment. A body of scholarship has 
emerged which challenges this assumption. This challenge has two dimensions. The first 
dimension draws on Wittgenstein to show that rather than there being one core definition or 
instance of friendship, friendship comes in varieties, and no one use or practice can be 
privileged over the others (Digeser 2016, Smith 2011a, 2014). Friendship has been understood 
as a public and a private relation; applied to states and individuals; obligatory and voluntary; 
hierarchical and equal; spiritual and secular. That this might sound surprising to the 
contemporary Western ear illustrates how parochial the use of friendship has become in the 
Western analytical lexicon, and it underlines the need for critical re-evaluation. The second 
dimension of the response is to focus on what the critic of friendship claims to know: what 
‘friendship’ is. Here, historical, philosophical, and theoretical work has demonstrated that the 
‘contemporary-affective’ or so-called ‘ordinary’ use of friendship is far more complex, 
confusing, and even contradictory than it first seems. Right from the start of the European 
tradition philosophers have struggled to say what friendship is. The ‘ordinary’ account might 
be oblivious to these problems but they are problems nonetheless. If, then, the ordinary 
language account of friendship is at least not ‘the only game in town’ (Digeser 2009), then this 
opens the possibility for a wider investigation and theorisation of friendship in politics and IR. 
In what follows we offer a sketch of some of the salient features of friendship in ancient and 
modern Western and Chinese traditions. We aim to demonstrate the transformations that 
friendship has undergone, and to draw points of contrast and comparison between traditions. 
This sets the scene for the discussion and re-theorisation of friendship in contemporary IR 




Friendship was a central category for the European ancients, and there is increasing recognition 
that this was not just an ethical, but also a political category (Price, 1989). This is also the case 
for friendship in Chinese tradition whose principal source is the thought of Confucius and his 
heirs (Analects, 1940:1.8, 9.25, 19.3; Kutcher, 2000:1615-16). Incongruous though this might 
seem to many contemporary IR scholars, it was not simply that the ancients fused what scholars 
might currently be inclined to treat separately: ethics and politics, the personal and the public. 
Instead, ancient theorisations constructed a concept of friendship which was just as central to 
theorising political life as ‘justice’ or ‘equality’ in Greek tradition, and ‘unity’ or ‘harmony’ in 
Chinese tradition. Thus, although there are differences between seminal accounts of friendship 
in Chinese and European thought, both traditions understood friendship as an important 
connector of politics, ethics, and human flourishing. 
Ancients in both Greek and Chinese traditions were concerned with one having the right kind 
of friends. Although they were often candid about the emotional, material and social 
advantages expected from friendship, these were not necessarily the principal reason for 
friendship. Notably, whilst affection might emerge, praiseworthy friends were to be chosen not 
so much for their particularity, but because they provided moral nourishment (Hall and Ames, 
1998:254-69). On this logic, Plato suggested that friendship could have a higher purpose 
connected to politics and the state. In Phaedrus, Plato stages a dialogue that forms the basis of 
the emerging friendship (philia) between Socrates and Phaedrus. Socrates seduces Phaedrus 
away from the influence of rhetorician Lysias, first by constructing an impressive speech on 
love, and then encouraging Phaedrus to become his fellow enquirer into the Good through 
dialogue. The dialogue ends with Socrates imploring the gods to give him inner beauty, 
temperance and wisdom, to which Phaedrus responds: ‘Please include me in your prayer, for 
friends hold everything in common’ (Plato, 1956:75). It is Socrates’ aspiration and ability to 
be virtuous that makes him a suitable friend for Phaedrus, and it is Phaedrus’ sharing of this 
desire that enables the friendship. For Plato, friendship becomes a necessary condition for 
realizing the good. It builds on a desire for self-improvement that the friends share, and that 
the friendship helps them augment and sustain this (Hall and Ames, 1998:256). This common 
search for the good also linked Platonic friendship to the production of the good state in his 
Republic (Plato, 1987; Price, 1989; Smith, 2011a). In these accounts, the key usefulness of the 
friend was to transform the self into something new and better, with more virtuous desires, 
which would in turn lead to harmony and stability in the state.  
In a similar way, Confucian friendship could and should sustain moral growth in support of 
family-state hierarchies. Confucian thought took five key relationships as its foundation, one 
of which was that between friends (you 友). The other four relationships denoted mutual 
obligation between father and son, ruler and minister, husband and wife, and older and younger 
brother. If everybody fulfilled their role in these relationships, families would be stable and 
harmonious and productive of the good subjects that would ensure stability and harmony for 
the state. Friendship should be supportive of the other four relationships, where the good friend 
might both offer respite from their demands and act as a virtuous example to emulate in order 
to become a better son, a better official, and a better subject (Kutcher, 2000). The importance 
of the friend as a virtuous example to emulate is so strong that Confucius repeatedly urges: ‘Do 
not have as a friend anyone who is not as good as you are’ (Analects, 1940:1.8, 9.25). Put 
differently, although one should be benevolent to those less virtuous than oneself, it is only 
one’s betters who support one’s self-improvement that can be considered true friends. The key 
virtue of concern here is the central Confucian value ren (仁), which is usually translated as 
‘benevolence’ or ‘love’. The Xunzi recalls a conversation between Confucius and a number of 




enlightened person ‘is one who loves himself’ (Hsun Tzu [Xunzi], 1966:105.29.29, cited in 
Hall and Ames, 1998:258). This self-love (zi’ai 自爱) is reflexive, where the self incorporates 
the entire field of concerns of self and other. Ren does not refer to an isolated agent, but as Hall 
and Ames (1998:258-9) explain, it describes a ‘mutually beneficial relationship between self 
and other… a complementarity grounded in the specific conditions of one’s cultivated 
relationship with another person’. Hall and Ames (1998:259) emphasize that the ‘self’ here is 
not an ‘ego-self’, but ‘an incipient, inchoate self that is radically situational, and hence 
reflexive’. Moreover, personal and communal realization is made possible by the cultivation 
and extension of this reflexive self with others. This relationality of the good ren is repeatedly 
underscored in the Analects, and is immediately visible from the written character ren 仁, which 
is made up of the radical for ‘person’ 人 and the number ‘two’ 二 (see Analects, 1940: 6.30, 
3.3, 15.39). 
These ancient pictures of friendship contrast with views that have become dominant after the 
advent of the nation-state. Of those thinkers in the European tradition who actively engage with 
friendship as a feature of politics, Carl Schmitt is infamous. Schmitt identifies the friend and 
enemy distinction as the defining feature of the political. Yet, in contrast to the rich theorisation 
of friendship in the ancient literature, Schmitt is surprisingly silent on what ‘friendship’ is. 
When Schmitt does elaborate on the meaning of friendship it is cashed-out in public terms and 
in relation to the homogenous identity of a people. He claims that such identity is one of the 
foundational principles of the state. When a people is conscious of its own identity as a nation 
‘it has the capacity to distinguish friend and enemy’ (Schmitt, 2008:247). Moreover, whereas 
the ancient literature is able to theorize political forms of friendship without reference to enmity, 
Schmitt appears unable (or unwilling) to do so. The definitions of enemy and friend are tied 
together and linked to the possibility of killing and being killed (Schmitt, 1996:26-27, 37, 45-
46). Although Schmitt maintains that we cannot determine in advance who is friend or enemy, 
these categories remain permanent features of his political thought, seemingly incapable of 
transformation. In many ways, Schmitt’s thought is paradigmatic of the fate of friendship in 
the modern state system; a fate which understands friendship as the less significant other of 
enmity, and ossifies both categories. 
It is perhaps not surprising that this view of friendship is paralleled in Mao Zedong’s thought 
insofar as it embraces the state, and a different applied article could profitably read Mao’s 
China through a Schmittean lens (indeed, Schmitt sometimes portrayed the dialectic between 
the proletariat and their oppressors in terms of the friend and enemy distinction). Fairly soon 
after China’s integration into the modern interstate system, society became dominated by 
Mao’s interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, which challenged the ancient understanding of 
friendship and to a large extent broke away from Confucian thinking (Kam, 1980). The 
fundamental importance of friendship can nonetheless be seen to have remained, albeit in a 
new guise. In Mao’s China this took a domestic and an external form. Domestically, friendship 
cast the highest friend as the selfless communist comrade (tongzhi 同志). The external form 
developed in the international arena was foreign-friendship (youyi 友谊). These Maoist terms 
captured the terrain of friendship for the communist cause, and realigned it from emphasizing 
harmony to a more confrontational polemicization. It no longer focused on mutually 
constituting elements in a harmoniously transforming relationship (as in Confucianism), but 
based its dialectic on dichotomized units that clashed in painful revolutions to push history 
forwards. Under Mao, such dichotomised entities included the ‘friend’ and the ‘enemy’. As 




Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the first importance 
for the revolution … To ensure that we will definitely achieve success in our revolution 
and will not lead the masses astray, we must pay attention to uniting with our real 
friends in order to attack our real enemies (Mao, 1961:13). 
In summary, this sketch of friendship in ancient and modern state-centric thought illustrates a 
displacement of friendship and what it originally represented: profound relationality and co-
constitution of self and other. The effects of this displacement are reflected in contemporary 
thought about politics and IR. In ancient thought friendship had a structuring role for 
individuals and political systems. Connected to virtue, it was a means by which political life 
could be stabilised and made harmonious. In modern politics, where the modern state has 
become dominant, the purview of friendship has been bifurcated. Along one branch, personal 
and individual friendships based around the emotions are now allowed to flourish – but strictly 
in the private sphere. Along the other, friendship is abstracted and put to work by the state in 
relations of group-belonging such as comradeship and nationality. Friendship is formulated as 
an Us in opposition to a Them; a Self opposed to Others. This suggests a profound shift in 
thinking about politics, which turns attention away from the possibility of relational production, 
reconciliation and even combination of distinctive and contrasting components. Instead, this 
shift emphasizes the assertion and preservation (or annihilation) of distinct and antagonistically 
opposed things. This latter view characterises the ontology of much IR scholarship. 
 
Marginalised friendship: IR and the ‘ontology of things’ 
If it is the case that the state system has marginalised friendship as a concern with co-
constitutive self-other relations from the political, how is this more broadly reflected in IR? 
This part revisits the ontological assumptions of ‘mainstream IR’ arguing that much 
contemporary IR rests not on an ontological focus on relations, but on an ‘ontology of things’ 
which has marginalised friendship. Surprisingly, not only is this true of Realism and Liberalism, 
but also of  Wendtian Constructivism where discussions of friendship explicitly appear. The 
fuller meaning of relational ontologies and the contribution of friendship to IR is explored in 
the next part.  
Common stories about the development of IR depict a Eurocentric discipline shaped by two 
related concerns. The first of these is an attempt to understand states as elements of a systematic 
whole (Waltz, 1979). The second is a focus on the establishment and maintenance of peace, or 
at least the avoidance of unnecessary conflict between states (Jervis, 1999:42). These two 
objectives have produced a range of theories of which varieties of Realism, Liberalism and 
constructivism are often said to be ‘mainstream’. Of these, Realism is habitually said to be 
dominant. One reason for this is that Realism emerged near the conception of the discipline of 
IR, as it is commonly rehearsed, and so other theories are in some way a response to Realism. 
More importantly, Realism set the tone for both the ontological assumptions of IR and its 
lexicon. This vocabulary is more than a choice of words, it identifies the ‘things’ of IR. 
Ontologically speaking, Realism set the rules of the game by setting the first lexicon of the 
discipline as it came to imagine itself. Key within this lexicon are ‘sovereignty’, ‘power’, 
‘state’, and ‘nation’.  Realists tend to view the international state system in terms of ‘anarchy’ 
constituted by sovereign states, seeking survival and locked into a ‘security dilemma’ as a 
result (Morgenthau, 1972; Mearsheimer, 1990:5-56). From its inception, then, IR was infused 




contained, independent, and unchanging unit. This view is exemplified by Waltz when he 
writes that states ‘are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a 
maximum, drive for universal domination’ (Waltz, 1979:118). 
Realism has adapted, transformed, and has been remarkably influential. As a result, even 
theories that offer an alternative approach or methodology for understanding the international 
system have tended to do so by positing themselves as critiques of, or alternatives to, Realism. 
Moreover, they have tended to accept the lexicon of Realism and its ontology of things. For 
example, most liberals accept the basic realist assumptions concerning the state and the basic 
rules of the game, in terms of the wider ontology (Milner, 1993:9; Keohane, 1993:272; Jervis, 
1999:43-44). Of course, liberals differ from realists by pointing to the role of norms and actors 
other than the state. However, by doing so they merely stress an additional consideration to 
that of the state; they do not seriously challenge its importance. As Robert Jervis (1999: 45) 
has observed, what differs is the level of focus. Liberals and Realists have conducted a lively 
debate, but they have been able to do so precisely because they share a lexicon and an ontology. 
Having identified their objects of study, they are only then concerned to theorise their 
interaction. In the words of Erik Ringmar (1996:441) ‘the state is given exogenously to the 
analysis … and hence endowed with something akin to a transcendental ontological status’. 
States are treated as pre-constituted calculating machines much in the same way that Hobbes 
theorises human beings (Ringmar, 1996:447). Factored out of IR is precisely the idea that the 
units in question can be transformed – moreover, constituted – through their interaction. 
If Realism and Liberalism share a core set of assumptions (and ontology of things), 
constructivism appears to offer something new. Indeed, at first blush constructivism appears to 
move away from the assumptions that underpin debate between realists and liberals, and to 
offer an alternative ontology. Here Alexander Wendt’s 1999 book Social Theory of 
International Politics is paradigmatic. In this book, constructivism is not a theory of IR, but a 
way of approaching ontology that is applied to a subject matter or field of enquiry (Wendt, 
1999:7). Wendt then uses the tools of constructivism to intervene in the debate between 
Realists and Liberals. His purpose is not to challenge their use of ‘the state’, but to confront 
how this is understood ontologically (Wendt, 1999:1). Wendt accepts that there are relations 
within the state, but this is not his concern (Wendt, 1999:246). Instead he attempts to show 
how states are to be considered persons. For Wendt, state behaviour does not depend on hard 
structural facts relating to ‘anarchy’ or fixed intentions (as Realists and Liberals might be 
inclined to think), but on how roles and identity are formed and maintained by interaction with 
others (Wendt, 1999:257).  
Wendt focuses on three roles that he says states cast for themselves and each other: enmity, 
rivalry, and friendship. Wendt’s point is that (contra Realists) anarchy has no predictive power 
for state behaviour. State behaviour is determined by how states identify themselves and others. 
This identity formation is relational. As Wendt writes: 
What this means is that in initially forming shared ideas about Self and Other 
through a learning process, and then in subsequently reinforcing those ideas 
casually through repeated interaction, Ego and Alter are at each stage jointly 
defining who each of them is (Wendt, 1999:335). 
Yet, despite appearing to offer an alternative to the ‘ontology of things’, Wendt’s theory of 
international politics falls back on it. Ironically, the feature of Wendt’s social constructivism 




thought might exemplify a relational ontology: his discussion of the social construction of ‘the 
identities and interests of purposive actors’ (Wendt, 1999:1), and in particular his use of the 
terms ‘Self’ and ‘Other’. Whilst this language might suggest that the ideas of Self and Other 
are doing significant work in Wendt’s theory (he himself capitalises them), in fact they elide 
complex theorisation rather than signal it. Wendt’s terms are little more than placeholders for 
what he must assume, but not theorise. 
This is best illustrated by comparing Wendt’s thought to other traditions that also employ these 
terms, not least feminism, post-colonialism and post-structuralism. In these traditions, ideas of 
Self and Other are drawn from a wider philosophical debate focused on the alterity of Self and 
Other. These traditions also point to the fluid and even contradictory meaning of the Self. This 
deeper meaning is not Wendt’s concern. Indeed, whilst Wendt makes the rather strong claim 
that the state is a kind of person, he does not spend much time thinking about the tensions 
inherent in the notion of personhood itself. Whilst real persons can have a range of relationships 
and roles, Wendt limits these to three in his cultures of anarchy: enmity, rivalry, and friendship. 
Wendt has a rather limited and static view of the relationship of friendship. Indeed, as Wendt 
claims, it is not a relationship but a role.  
It is worth thinking here about what roles mean. Wendt uses the example of the role of the 
president of the USA as an illustration (Wendt, 1999:258-9). This is instructive as the powers 
of the president are famously defined and limited by the constitution of the USA. Irrespective 
of the person who fills this role, qua president that person can only act in certain prescribed 
ways. In Wendt’s world, friends must rehearse their friendship in a narrowly scripted way. This 
is peculiar when we consider the rich variety of friendships individual persons conduct. 
Wendt’s limitation of the possible relationships that a state as person can have, and in particular 
his limitations of the transformative nature of friendship, does not indicate a relational ontology 
but an ontology of things. The state’s relations are not transformative of Self and Other. 
Although the roles that states adopt can change their interests, the roles themselves are fixed. 
The consequences of this identity fixing becomes especially evident when Wendt conflates 
Self and Other with Ego and Alter. These terms carry different connotations. Whilst self and 
other (and especially Self and Other) can indicate radical difference or alterity, Ego and Alter 
are, in fact, a linked pair. In Latin, ‘Ego’ denotes I, we, myself, and us, whereas ‘Alter’ does 
not mean Other in the strong sense that links it to difference, strangeness, and alterity, but the 
other of two, the second, the other one. Thus the idiom alter ego: the other, which is linked to 
the first I and has identity with it.  
Thus, although Wendt talks about a constitutive relation between self and other, we might 
question how serious he is about this. The other encountered in this relationship is really a form 
of self. Wendt’s three cultures of anarchy do not depend on difference between actors, but on 
what they share. The only real encounter of difference in his book (between self and other, 
rather than alter and ego) is that of Cortés and Moctezuma (Wendt, 1999:158). This encounter 
is telling as it exemplifies exactly what Wendt cannot theorise with his view of ‘relations’. The 
encounter between Cortés and Moctezuma is a real encounter between Self and Other. The two 
are alien to each other; they do not fit into one other’s script. By using this encounter to 
illustrate the claim that culture needs to be shared, Wendt betrays the fact that such shared 
culture depends on a relation of self-self, not Self-Other. Furthermore, what the Self and Other 
are in Wendt’s thought remains ‘fixed’ (at least at the level of his analysis). What is transformed 




behaviour of those units. Identity is central and possible precisely because in others the self 
sees not alterity and difference, but an Alter Ego. 
From this discussion of Realists, Liberals and constructivists it is clear that even accounts that 
have tried to theorise the relationships of IR, including friendship, have tended to fall back on 
an ontology of things. In doing so, they have failed to account for states as embroiled in 
complex processes of becoming with others. In this way, much IR literature fails to adequately 
engage with the central questions raised by friendship, questions concerned with the co-
constitution of self and other. Nevertheless, friendship persists in IR as an intellectual space or 
question in need of theorisation.   
 
A Return to Friendship: ‘relational ontologies’, guanxi, and Daoist dialectics 
In the first of the previous two parts outlined the bifurcation of friendship in much modern 
political thought. This bifurcation saw friendship displaced from the possibility of theorising 
self with other, to an understanding of friendship as either private (and thus not truly political), 
or a community bond which opposes ‘Us’ (the Self) to ‘Them’ (the Other). Such ‘Us versus 
Them’ relations tend towards mutual antagonism. In the second part this bifurcation was related 
to the development of IR based on an ‘ontology of things’. This ontology theorises the 
existence of discrete entities as prior to any relations that they might have. 
We are now in a position to consider the contribution of Chinese scholarship to these debates 
about ontology and self-other relations in IR. In what follows we show how Daoist dialectics 
can complement the ‘ontology of things’ that has stressed the conflictual incompatibility of 
Self and Other. The focus on relational ontologies in recent Chinese thought provides a 
platform to reintroduce friendship to the IR discipline. Such reintroduction does not only 
refocus on relations, but on the very possibilities of thinking Self with Other. We develop this 
line of thought by discussing friendship and relationality in three key theorists: Qin Yaqing, 
Felix Berenskötter, and L. H. M. Ling. Qin argues that ‘guanxi’ relations (关系) should be the 
hard core of a Chinese IR theory, and uses Daoist ‘Chinese dialectic’ to overcome what he sees 
as the conflictual understanding of dialectic in the West. Such a dialectic denies dichotomy and 
suggests mutual structuring. Berenskötter is also concerned to overcome the dichotomy of self-
other, and suggests friendship can tame the ontological anxiety of the state. Such a relation 
accepts, but reconciles, difference. Finally, Ling develops relationality through Daoist 
dialectics. Rather than separate self and other, and attend to the anxiety induced by this 
separation, Ling points to the co-dependency and intermingling of self with other. 
 
Qin: guanxi (关系) and dialectics 
A proponent of a ‘Chinese school’ of IR theory, Qin Yaqing, has been key to refocusing 
relationality in IR. Qin argues that the basis for Western IR theory is ‘individuality’ whilst the 
Chinese model is focused on ‘relationality’, upon which he proposes a ‘relational theory of 
world politics’ (2009:5; 2016; 2017; 2018). Furthermore, Qin (2009:5) suggests, ‘mainstream 
International Relations theories that have arisen in the past thirty years … have all missed an 
important dimension, i.e., the study of processes in the international system and of relational 




argues that ‘Western society’ is based on independent individuality, like bundles of rice straw 
tied together by social contract and institutions. ‘Chinese society’ is instead like the continuous 
circles that ripple outwards from a pebble dropped on the surface of water. The ripples spread 
social relations and each circle is connected in one way or another (Fei, 2007; see Qin, 2009:6). 
Qin emphasises friendship ‘guanxi’ (关系), in his development of Chinese relational ontology. 
In contrast to sociological accounts which focus on guanxi’s role is support networks and 
welfare provision, or its role in diplomacy in creating friendly ‘feeling’ (ganqing 感情) between 
peoples, which can help them develop a guanxi relationship (Brady, 2003:15), Qin (2005a; 
2009) argues that guanxi should form the ‘hard core’ of a Chinese IR theory. He focuses on 
guanxi as an ontological assumption of IR which differs from ‘Western’ interpretations, as 
embodied in theories like structural Realism, Neo-Liberal institutionalism and structural 
constructivism (Qin, 2005b; 2009:5). Qin argues that taking relations as the focal point of IR 
steers away from understandings of relations between states that start with state units or 
individuals and conceive of their relations as secondary. In Qin’s view, a reliance on guanxi 
means Chinese people have a distinct and geo-culturally determined way of thinking about 
relations between peoples, which is different from Western thinking. Whereas in European 
social science ‘rationality became the dominant word’ in Chinese thought the counterpart is 
‘relationality’ (Qin, 2009:5). 
In his account of guanxi relationality, Qin takes processes and agents to be symbiotic and ‘inter-
constitutive’ in an intermingled practice of socialization. There can be no one-way causality 
between the two, because neither precedes the other and neither is external to the other (Qin, 
2009:9; 2016:39). Qin illustrates these relations through the yin-yang symbol that is common 
to explaining Daoist thought. This symbol consists of a black and a white half that together 
form a ‘harmonious and holistic’ circle (Qin, 2009:9; 2016:39). The circle does not exist 
without the halves; the halves cannot form a shape without the circle. In this way, ‘[y]in, yang, 
and the circle are in and of one simultaneously’ (Qin, 2009:9). The relationship between agents 
and process must therefore be interpreted in terms of circular constitution, rather than linear 
causality. 
 
Figure 1: Yin-yang (Wikimedia commons, 2005). 
 
Qin further explains this in terms of what he calls a ‘Chinese dialectic’ of change and 
inclusiveness, which he contrasts with a ‘Hegelian dialectic’ (Qin, 2009:10; 2016:39). In his 
view, the ‘Western way of thinking’ focuses on the independent entity and tends to assume 
discreteness (Qin, 2009:10; 2016:39). On its dichotomizing understanding, A can never be non-
A, because the two have essentially different properties. In contrast, in Qin’s Chinese dialectic, 
A can be non-A or includes non-A; it is inclusive and puts emphasis on change. On this 
understanding, there can be no social actors that pre-exist social relations and process. The 
process of relationships moreover transform both the behaviour and the essential properties of 
actors involved. A can transform non-A or be transformed into non-A. In contrast to Qin’s 




thesis and antithesis complement one another to make a harmonious whole. In this way, yin-
yang relationality, ‘denies the dichotomously structured concept of “thesis vs. anti-thesis” or 
“us vs. them.”’ (Qin, 2016:40). 
In recent writing Qin highlights the importance of friendship as a neglected kind of relationship 
in IR, with reference to its theorisation by Felix Berenskötter (Qin, 2016:37). Although Qin 
does not discuss Berenskötter other than to underline the importance of friendship, dwelling 
on it here can bring out the distinct contribution of relational ontologies that draw on Chinese 
thought to the broader discussion of this topic.  
 
Berenskötter: friendship and anxiety 
Berenskötter, like Qin, sees limitations in an ontology that assumes ‘the individual (state) as 
an autonomy-seeking entity’ common to mainstream Western IR (Berenskötter, 2007:653). 
Berenskötter draws on Heidegger to advocate an ‘evolutionary ontology of the state as 
something which is neither static nor ever complete but a work in progress, something always 
in the process of becoming’ (Berenskötter, 2007:655). Berenskötter draws on feminism, 
poststructuralism and other European thought to propose that states are not primarily concerned 
about other states that threaten their survival (as Realists, for example, might have it), but rather 
about uncertainty as such (Berenskötter, 2007:655). Anxiety about uncertainty and 
incompleteness provides ‘the foundational sentiment defining the human condition’ 
(Berenskötter, 2007:655). It is because of such fundamental anxiety that people and states are 
said to ‘look for what Anthony Giddens calls “anxiety-controlling mechanisms” employed to 
gain “ontological security”, or a stable sense of Self’ (Berenskötter, 2007:656). States, on his 
view, seek friendship to control anxiety (Berenskötter, 2007:656). Berenskötter bases his 
understanding of friendship on that of Aristotle, and highlights a number of features that we 
suggest Aristotle’s account has in common with that of Confucius’: that true friends share a 
common goal of virtue, that such virtue is obtainable primarily through activity with virtuous 
friends, that this process is what can lead to harmony (Berenskötter, 2007:664-68). 
However, Berenskötter’s friendship is not simply rooted in a sense of group-membership or 
identification with humanity in general. Part of friendship’s ability to control anxiety stems 
from its capacity to ‘sustain the individual’s sense of self by treating [it] particularistically’ 
(Berenskötter, 2007:664). A similar concern with particularity or alterity has led philosophers 
such as Derrida to worry that Aristotle’s understanding of friendship as an extension of self-
love collapses the differentiation between self and other, and therefore negates the very 
possibility of a friendship relation in the first place (Berenskötter, 2007:667; Derrida, 1997:11). 
Here, the worry is that understanding the friend as ‘another Self’, as Aristotle does, makes it a 
narcissistic extension of that Self, and therefore treats it as derivative. In this sense, the 
hierarchy of the ‘total’ construct obliterates or ignores difference. If we follow Derrida and 
understand politics to be made possible by a plurality of being, or better perhaps of becoming, 
this merging of selves would make friendship apolitical. Therefore, Berenskötter notes, ‘in 
order to conceptualise friendship as a relationship in which politics occurs, friendship relations 
must allow for heterogeneity and be conceived ‘through a philosophy of difference so as to be 
rendered politically relevant’ (Berenskötter, 2007:668). 
The tendency to construct difference negatively that Derrida identifies in Aristotle’s friendship 




claimed that it is Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Western thought that creates the 
hierarchical and totalising understanding of difference (Massey, 2005:49-54). Berenskötter’s 
reading of friendship, in Aristotle and in IR more generally, also centres on concerns with the 
individual’s sense of particularity and self and the anxiety that stems from it. He is not alone 
in such a focus, which regularly occurs in literatures interested in ontological security, 
including those that focus on China (Gustavsson, 2016; Pan, 2014:455-6). By contrast to those 
who understand this type of ontological anxiety to be a feature of Western thought, Shih Chih-
yu argues that one of the things that distinguishes the Chinese relational turn in IR, is that it 
concerns anxiety rather than passion. He sees in both ‘China’ and ‘the West’ a ‘general feeling 
of anxiety ingrained in relationality’, which can be calmed when positive feeling in 
relationships provide individualized and mutually assuring recognition (Shih, 2016). 
 
Ling: the intimacy of ‘self and other’, and the possibility of multiple worlds 
So far, we have seen that relationality and ‘friendship’ have played a key role in both Qin’s 
and Berenskötter’s thinking about the nature of IR. In particular, both link relationality to 
questions of the co-construction and dependence of self and other. Berenskötter seeks to show 
how friendship can allay a state’s anxiety as it seeks recognition of its self from others. Qin 
develops his notion of relationality through Daoist yin-yang dialectics, which he renationalises 
as ‘Chinese’ dialectics. For him the issue is not so much reconciling self and other, but realising 
that self and other are inter-constitutive. Thus, although Berenskötter and Qin agree about the 
co-constitution of self and other, they place different importance on the origin and permanence 
of antagonism between self and other. For Berenskötter anxiety appears to be a permanent 
ontological fact of self-other relations. It can be tamed, but not eradicated. In contrast, Qin sees 
no such tension as ontologically foundational. However, this also indicates another contrast. 
Berenskötter’s Heideggerian self and other have the potential to be radically different, whereas 
Qin’s Wendtian foundations attenuates difference. 
A similar understanding of yin-yang relationality is also at the root of L. H. M. Ling’s 
‘worldism’. Ling critiques what she calls ‘Westphalia World’, the common understanding or 
hegemonic vision of IR that includes the ‘mainstream approaches’ that we have shown to be 
characterised by an ontology of things. Ling shows how this view and its ontology ‘perpetrates 
a profound violence’ by denying its reliance on those it excludes, as well as their knowledges 
and ways of knowing, what she calls ‘Multiple Worlds’. Ling also reacts against Wendt’s claim 
that first encounters like those between Cortés and Moctezuma led to an accretion of culture at 
the systemic level, leaving the enemy, the rival and the friend as the only roles available to 
others, locking out any other considerations of relations among worlds (Ling, 2014:30). As a 
result of such an ontology of things, Ling describes how a ‘“postcolonial anxiety” festers in 
Multiple Worlds that, in turn, aggravates a “colonial anxiety” in Westphalia World’ (Ling, 
2014:3). This leads to a nihilistic logic where the lives of others need to be forfeited in order 
to save one’s own.  
Ling offers an alternative to that violent and anxious worldview in the form of a Daoist dialectic 
similar to Qin’s. Ling writes that in such a Daoist dialectic the ‘complementarities (yin) prevail 
despite the contradictions (yang) between and within the polarities. Nothing remains static or 
the same’ (Ling, 2014:15). This worldview strives to re-centre contributions to world politics 




with Westphalia world. It is thus a response to the negative spiral of violence and anxiety in 
the relation between Westphalia World and Multiple Worlds: 
A dao of world politics propels us from this dilemma. In recognizing the ontological 
parity of things, a post-Westphalian IR experiences the constant potential of creative 
transformations due to the mutual interactions that transpire, especially between 
opposites. Multiplicity and difference manifest, enacted by local agents and their 
transformations of knowledge (Ling, 2014:3). 
In this way, and in contrast to Wendt’s account of relations which falls back on an ontology of 
things, this worldview emphasizes a recognition of the complexity of the self, which includes 
traces or elements of the other in the self. Intimacy, rather than autonomy, marks its condition 
(Ling, 2014:12). However, the point is not to replace Westphalia World with Multiple Worlds, 
just as the point is not for the ontology of things to be superseded by relational ontologies. 
Rather, the Daoist dialectic urges us to move closer towards balance and engagement. In Ling’s 
terms, ‘[f]ortified with Daoist dialectics, worldism re-visibilizes Multiple Worlds in relation to 
one another as well as to Westphalia World’ (Ling, 2014:18). Equally, we might say that it 
makes multiple relational ontologies visible again, both in relation to one another and in 
relation to the ontology of things. The area of intersection between different ontologies forms 
a dialogical space. However, unlike the Socratic dialogue on friendship, Daoist dialectics do 
not presuppose that there is a stable and discoverable truth independent of human perspectives 
(Ling, 2014:66). 
Ling’s insistence on this contrapuntuality between West and Rest, Self and Other, ‘to jointly 
produce the complicities that endure despite and sometimes because of the mutual conflicts 
that tear them apart’ adds an important emphasis to Qin’s account (Ling, 2014:45). Qin is 
clearly aware that the relational ontology he advocates is not uniquely Chinese, that it has both 
ancient and contemporary parallels in Europe and elsewhere. Our previous discussions of 
friendship have highlighted further commonalities between Confucian and ancient Greek 
understandings of friendship in their focus on friendship as a relationship of learning for the 
purpose of developing virtue. Ling’s efforts to articulate her ‘Multiple Worlds’ without falling 
back on dichotomisations of ‘the West’ and ‘China’ (or ‘the Rest’) helps to further underscore 
that the ‘Chinese view’ that Qin describes need not be exoticised as a geo-culturally specific 
example. On the contrary, it might even be contemporary IR theories which have assumed an 
ontology of things and marginalised friendship relations that should be considered to be a 
highly specific exception to the more general global and historical trend. 
Furthermore, the move away from a focus on individuality in Qin’s yin-yang processual 
constructivism and Ling’s Daoist dialectic decentres the prior focus on anxiety. We are not 
suggesting that Berenskötter, Shih and others are wrong in observing existing anxiety. We are, 
however, suggesting that these emotions are as constructed as the relations that are said to 
provoke and sooth them. In Qin’s guanxi relations, affect and emotion have an important role, 
but do so in terms of ‘collective emotion’, rather than in terms of the anxiety that resides within 
the self (Qin, 2009:12). On a similar note, Ling’s Daoist dialectic of multiple worlds is offered 
as a ‘social ontology’, ‘a vision, an understanding, a state of being to treat and put into 
remission this “postcolonial anxiety”’ (Ling, 2014:31-32). We may all be in a process of 
becoming, but there would be no reason to be anxious about this if we never attached ourselves 
to an ontology of things or of being in the first place. To Berenskötter, to reach harmony means 
to ‘tame anxiety’, and so friends matter because they can help us provide some sense of 




competitive relationships’ drawing on Chinese tradition (Shih, 2016). On at least one reading 
of the yin-yang dialectic, harmony is not the opposite of anxiety. Granted, harmony depends 
on our ability to manage relationships in a way that mediates disagreement, but this process as 
described by Qin and Ling is very different from that of taming the anxious self. 
 
Conclusion: Rediscovering friendship in international relations 
This article started with claims that China will be a new and friendlier kind of great power, 
because it relies on a Chinese relational ontology instead of a Western ontology of things. Our 
focus has been on friendship as a component of relational ontologies in the theories of IR. We 
have suggested that it is a mistake to essentialize or exoticize relational ontologies as being 
specifically Chinese; the predominance of an ontology of things in IR may be the exception 
rather than the rule in global and historical perspective. Chinese thought is a useful reminder 
to scholars of resources and ways of thinking that contemporary views of politics and IR either 
ignore or neglect. Chinese thought on friendly relations can make a distinct contribution to 
disciplinary efforts to develop relational ontologies. Relational ontologies are an essential 
counterpart to the ‘ontology of things’ which is so foundational in much contemporary IR. 
Chinese relational ontologies suggest that understanding the co-constitution of Self and Other 
is both necessary and useful if we are to have a fuller understanding of international politics. 
Moreover, Chinese thought shows that the relations between Self and Other need not be 
conflictual or colonial. On the contrary, they can be the basis for a dynamic of interdependent 
growth and change.  
Thus, the relational ontologies considered in this article provide an alternative starting point 
for understanding China’s friendliness in international relations, which differs from common 
accounts in Chinese official, academic and diplomatic discourse. Through them, we come to 
see how China’s friendliness and ‘peaceful rise’ will not depend on the autonomous actions of 
some imagined independent ‘China’, or on some essential characteristics of the Chinese people, 
nation or state. Nor does it require conformity, integration or socialisation into an imagined 
‘international society’ (cf. Ling, 2014: 91). Most importantly, scholars do not have to assume 
that IR is built up of state-units that are made anxious by the incompleteness and change that 
is indicated by the presence of others. Nor do they have to assume that the only possible 
significance of friendship is to sooth the anxious self. Instead, friendship can be understood as 
that which creates and maintains our continuous becoming with others, and the ontological 
parity of multiple worlds. 
That we have found contemporary discussions based on Chinese epistemic legacies to add to 
the debate in constructive ways does not indicate a necessary link to subject positions 
designated as ‘Chinese’. Specifically, much policy and discourse of the Chinese state is wedded 
to ‘Westphalia world’, as expressed in its fixation on territorial sovereignty, the claim that 
others should not voice opinions about China’s ‘internal affairs’, the demand that those who 
are considered ‘insiders’ be patriotically loyal to the Party-state, and strong attachment to the 
‘ontology of things’ more generally. We want to be clear, therefore, that the Daoist political 
imaginary suggested here offers a new vocabulary for those who want to think differently about 
relationality and anxiety in IR, regardless of whether they are speaking from China, about 
China, or neither. This is not ‘how Chinese people think, feel and behave’, it is how people 
could think, feel and behave. It offers IR a different starting point to what many of us are used 




about those worlds in a different way. It offers one possibility, which does not exclude or 
denigrate other possibilities for thinking world politics. 
Some critics will object that while it might be a better world if state identities were accepted 
as insecure and both elites and the public were to see each other as parts of a whole, this seems 
unlikely. Indeed, since the Western world does largely accept the ontology of things, it remains 
unclear how the view espoused here could come to fruition without a fundamental change in 
world view. Such critics speak from what Robert Cox famously referred to as problem-solving 
theory, which ‘takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships 
and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action’ (Cox, 
1981, 128-129). To these critics we want to suggest that now commonplace ideas like 
democracy, human rights, the abolition of slavery, or gender equality were all criticized as 
unlikely to be implemented at some point in history. Nonetheless, they continued to be 
developed as alternative vocabularies and ideas to those that dominated intellectual discourse 
at the time of their emergence. The dominance of one set of ideas in a particular society or 
system is not a good reason to refrain from exploring alternative ways of thinking and doing 
world politics. Quite the opposite, as critical academics we should explore what may be made 
possible by mobilising alternative vocabularies, ideas, and traditions of thought, even if we do 
not make hubristic claims that our writing alone will transform the world. 
It is as a possible alternative starting point for thinking that the concern of friendship is useful. 
As we have argued, friendship should not be understood as simply denoting a concern with the 
personal and private. In fact, its historical and cultural usage is far broader and more complex 
than that. Friendship is useful to IR insofar as it helps us to refocus on relations, and to conceive 
of those relations as a constitutive dynamism of self with other. Bringing friendship back to 
parity can help us grapple with something that is lost when we focus on enmity, conflict, war 
and disjuncture: what it means to ‘become’ in relation with Others. This is different from 
discussions of agreements and alliances, or understandings of international community that 
still see peoples and states as discrete entities based on an ‘ontology of things’. Chinese thought 
thus reintroduces an ontology of relations to the West and to the discipline of IR, and acts as a 
reminder of what has been forgotten. Such a meeting does not reinforce the supposed 
differences between China and the West, but acts as a reminder that they are part of creating 
each other. Whilst an ontology of things tends to cast friendship as a conflictual ‘Us and Them’, 
the relational ontology of contemporary Chinese debates on friendship can contribute to such 
debates by viewing other possibilities for Self and Other. Friendship achieves this through its 
focus on the relationship of the friends, and the way in which this relationship is formed by, 
and forms, both Self and Other. This ontology re-opens the possibilities for friendship as a way 
of conceptualising Self with Other, rather than Self in contrast to Other.  
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